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I. INTRODUCTION 
When in May 2016, Peng Jiyue, a Chinese lawyer employed by 
the Chinese part of the international law firm Dentons Dacheng, 
undertook to represent the family of Lei Yang, a young environmental 
activist who had died under suspicious circumstances in police custody, 
it was an act of kindness, partly motivated by friendship with the 
family. They had  not formally appointed him in writing, but he 
accompanied them to view the bruised body and called for an 
independent autopsy on their behalf.    The authorities claimed that Lei 
had died of a heart attack during a raid on a brothel, whereas his friends 
 
* Reader in Transnational Law, King’s College London;  affiliated researcher, NYU U.S.-
Asia Law Institute. The author would like to thank an anonymous current LL.B. student at 
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and family thought he had been beaten to death as a result of his 
activism.1 
A few days later, Lawyer Peng abruptly withdrew from the case.2 
Shortly after his withdrawal, other lawyers from the same firm took on 
the representation of the police officers alleged to bear direct 
responsibility in Lei’s death. 3  Subsequently, another lawyer, Chen 
Youxi, started representing the family. 4  A settlement between the 
police and the family, reportedly reached due to great pressure on the 
family, led to the dropping of charges against the officers in question.5 
This sequence of events raised the question if Dentons had 
become implicated in an apparent  conflict of interest.6 There was also 
the question why Lawyer Peng had withdrawn in the first place. Did 
this happen following a request by the authorities? Much was left to 
speculation, and the concerns that had been raised were not, apparently, 
followed up. The incident illustrated, at any rate, how problematic 
operating in the Chinese legal system can be. It suggested that this 
system could pose threats to lawyers’ autonomy, as well as their 
professional integrity, especially in “sensitive” cases. 
The autonomy and integrity of the legal profession have long been 
understood as a cornerstone of the rule of law, and lawyers have been 
important actors in the struggle for more open societies in many 
places. 7  The governments and civil society of the United States, 
continental European nations, and the United Kingdom have long 
 
1. Anne Henochowitz, Minitrue: Man dies in Beijing Police Custody, CHINA DIGITAL 
TIMES (May 10, 2016, 6:19 PM), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/05/minitrue-beijing-man-
dies-police-custody/ [https://perma.cc/3FGJ-PV4B]; Li Fangping, 大成律所历来不办类似案
件， 难道官方委托或指定除外？, WEIBO (June 28, 2016) http://www.weibo.com/17868226
05/DCibt6ZYI?type=comment#_rnd1467451531408 [screenshot of broken link on file with 
author] (discussing this case). 
2. Samuel Wade, Lei Yang Case Closure Stirs Discontent, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES, (Dec. 
29, 2016, 12:06 AM), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/12/lei-yang-case-closure-related-
censorship-stir-discontent/ [https://perma.cc/S78R-J9MD]. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Dentons accused of conflict of interest over Chinese corpse, ROLLONFRIDAY (July 8, 
2016), http://www.rollonfriday.com/TheNews/EuropeNews/tabid/58/Id/4660/fromTab/58/
currentIndex/58/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/NU6S-XVW8]. 
7. Terence C. Halliday et al., Introduction—The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political 
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL 
COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM  1-42  (Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik, Malcolm 
M. Feeley eds., 2007). 
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engaged in efforts to develop and export what one might call rule of 
law “best practice” models. They have trained key actors in the legal 
system such as judges, lawyers, prosecutors and the police, and 
conducted exchanges at with partners in authoritarian jurisdictions such 
as China.8 The professional bodies representing the legal profession, 
such as the Law Society of England and Wales and the Bar Council in 
the United Kingdom, have long interacted with the All China Lawyers’ 
Association and its local branches to promote rule of law through 
improvements for the legal profession.9 
Against the wider background of collaboration and exchange, 
foreign governments, legal professional bodies, and entities working 
with them have also not shied away from criticizing the Chinese 
government (and other governments) for persecuting human rights 
lawyers. For example, in the wake of a crackdown that began in July 
2015, the United Kingdom’s Bar Human Rights Committee issued a 
joint statement condemning the crackdown for its flagrant violations of 
human rights standards. 10  The Committee’s letter detailed these 
violations and drew attention to the “significant implications” these 
cases had for the rule of law and exercise of the legal profession in 
China.11 Such engagement is very commendable; and it is important 
that it continue.  The situation has never been worse for China’s human 
rights lawyers. The latest crackdown on human rights lawyers, 
discussed later on, has made this entirely clear; it has seen hundreds of 
lawyers and their assistants detained and questioned, as well as several 
held incommunicado for long periods, tortured, and publicly paraded 
“admitting guilt” and expressing repentance.12 
 
8. Thomas E. Kellogg, Western Funding for Rule of Law Initiatives in China: the 
importance of a civil society based approach, 2012 CHINA PERSP. 3, 53-59. 
9. See, e.g., Holly McKenzie, Meeting with the China Law Society, THE L. SOC’Y (Nov. 
8, 2017, 4:39 PM), http://communities.lawsociety.org.uk/international/regions/north-asia-and-
the-pacific/china/meeting-with-the-china-law-society/5063447.fullarticle [https://perma.cc/6P
KV-BWY5] (reporting on discussions about opening up markets in second tier Chinese cities).  
10. See Open Letter from Kirsty Brimelow QC, Chair, Bar Human Rights Comm. of Eng. 
and Wales to Xi Jinping, President of China (July 17, 2015) http://www.barhumanrights.org.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/china-activists.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQL9-D9E7]; see also 
An Open Letter by Legal Professionals To President Xi Jinping On the Occasion of the 
anniversary of the 709 Crackdown, CHINA HUM. RTS. LAW. CONCERN GROUP  (July 15, 
2016), http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en/content/open-letter-legal-professionals-president-xi-
jinping-occasion-anniversary-709-crackdown [https://perma.cc/34KS-GX3E] [hereinafter 
Open Letter to President Xi Jinping]. 
11. See Open Letter from Kirsty Brimelow QC, supra note 10; Open Letter to President 
Xi Jinping, supra note 10.  
12. See infra note 37. 
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But to be effective, commitment to the excellent standards 
invoked here should be demonstrated throughout the legal profession’s 
engagement with colleagues in authoritarian systems. China’s human 
rights lawyers are a tiny group of legal professionals whose situation is 
especially dire; but their predicaments reflect problems of the legal 
profession more widely. Party-State control of the legal profession is 
pervasive, and repression of forceful rights advocacy is inherent to the 
political-legal system. When international firms go to China, do they 
buy into such repression? When Chinese firms go abroad, do their 
lawyers bring repressive regulatory demands and practices with them? 
Up to a point. In this artcle, I discuss a few key aspects of control 
of the domestic and international legal profession in China. I argue that 
the regulatory scheme that international firms practicing in China 
subscribe to systematically undermines the autonomy of the legal 
profession, the lawyer’s duty (under UK rules, discussed by way of 
example) to uphold the autonomy of the law, and the ability of law 
firms and lawyers to keep client information confidential,. This has 
further implications under international law standards. In addition, 
weak rule of law and extra-legal, illegal or even criminal Party-State 
interference with legal practice may affect the international legal 
profession indirectly and end up implicating international law firms in 
the human rights violations of the Party-State. However, attempting to 
discuss the nexus between “big law” and human rights lawyer 
persecution in authoritarian countries is an attempt to lift the lid of a 
very large black box. The analysis that follows will in part consist of a 
study of available rules, and in part rely on hypothesizing, rather than 
proving, likely facts. A wider, systematic, evidence-based study of this 
issue is as yet outstanding. 
II. DOMESTIC VICTIMHOOD AND COMPLICITY 
Domestically, the legal profession is subject to stringent controls, 
most importantly through a licensing system that is maintained by the 
Ministry of Justice (“MoJ”), aided by the All China Lawyers’ 
Association (“ACLA”), in accordance with the 2007 Law on Lawyers 
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and further regulations.13 ACLA claims to be a self-regulatory body.14 
But both the MoJ and ACLA are subject to Party-State controls.15 As 
argued in the following, all the officially recognized organizations of 
the legal profession, including individual law firms, come within the 
reach of Party-State control and are therefore potentially both victims 
and complicit (if at times reluctant) supporters of a governance system 
designed to repress activist and human rights defense-orientated 
lawyering. The interlocking systems of control   rely on  mechanisms 
of “relational repression” to achieve comprehensive control.16 
To obtain a license to practice, lawyers must not only fulfil 
professional requirements but also swear allegiance to the Party as well 
as to the rule of law.17 Lawyers operate under an ethics code issued by 
the ACLA, called the “Basic Rules on Lawyers’ Professional Ethics,” 
according to whose Article 1 they “shall be firm in the ideal and belief 
in socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhere to the essential 
attribute of the socialist lawyer system with Chinese characteristics, 
uphold the party’s leadership and the socialist system, and consciously 
uphold the dignity of the Constitution and the law.”18 As the Party itself 
and scholars commenting on these developments have pointed out, 
“maintaining the leadership” of the Communist Party of China 
(“CPC”) is increasingly a “fundamental requirement” of the Party’s 
conception of law. 19  Genuine rule of law reform, understood as a 
 
13. See EVA PILS, CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE 
146-88 (2014);  see also 中华人民共和国律师法 [People’s Republic of China Law on 
Lawyers] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective 
June 1, 2008) (for the Chinese text, see http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-
10/28/content_788495.htm [https://perma.cc/57WD-BS3A]) (for an English translation,  see 
National People’s Congress of the People’s of China, Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Lawyers (2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4QT2-B2CB]). 
14. PILS, supra note 13. 
15.  Id.  
16. Yanhua Deng & Kevin O’Brien, Relational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to 
Demobilize Protesters, 215 CHINA Q. 533, 533-52 (2013).  
17. Joshua Rosenzweig, New Pledge of Allegiance for Chinese Lawyers, SIWEILUOZI’S 
BLOG (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.siweiluozi.net/2012/03/new-pledge-of-allegiance-for-
chinese.html [https://perma.cc/5MQD-ZVEF]. 
18. 律师职业道德基本准则 [Basic Principles of Lawyer’s Professional Ethics], ALL 
CHINA LAW. ASS’N (June 2, 2015), http://www.dffyw.com/faguixiazai/ssf/201506/38582.html 
[https://perma.cc/U597-3KVH]. 
19. 党的领导和社会主义法治是一致的，社会主义法治必须坚持党的领导，党的领
导必须依靠社会主义法治, translated by China Law Translate, CCP Central Committee 
decision concerning several major issues in comprehensively advancing governance according 
to law, CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Oct. 28, 2014), http://chinalawtranslate.com/fourth-plenum-
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project enhancing control of public power and the protection of 
fundamental rights, is increasingly in jeopardy, as recent commentary 
from the Supreme People’s Court’s President Zhou Qiang illustrated. 
20  The judiciary “should resolutely resist,” he said, “erroneous 
influence from the West: ‘constitutional democracy,’ ‘separation of 
powers’ and ‘independence of the judiciary,’ [and] make clear our 
stand and dare to show the sword.” 21  In other words, becoming a 
lawyer in China is premised on committing to upholding a political-
legal system that lies well outside the normative framework of current 
public international law which, inter alia, includes Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers and commitments to protecting Human Rights 
Defenders.22 
To keep their license, licensed Chinese lawyers must pass an 
annual re-assessment, which examines their overall performance, also 
in terms of political conformity criteria. Law firms are subject to a 
separate licensing system. 23  As has been widely documented, 
assessment and re-assessment of lawyers serve, inter alia, the function 
of controlling any political activity by lawyers.24 Numerous cases of 
lawyers or law firms having their licenses suspended or revoked 
because they handled “sensitive” cases or brought certain legal 
challenges against the authorities have been documented, including 
those of Liu Wei and Tang Jitian.25 Due to the overwhelming and 
paramount position of the Party, some of the aforementioned 
problematic lawyer conduct mentioned results from their dependence 
on Party leadership. 
For example, upholding the party’s leadership may mean that a 
law firm might tell its lawyer that they must refuse to accept 
instructions for a client at the behest of a Party-State official – that is, 
 
decision/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/8UGB-VFM6]; Chongyi Feng, Chinese Socialist Rule of 
Law – A Critical Appraisal of the Relationship Between the Communist Party and 
Comprehensive Law Reform,  in JOHN GARRICK & YAN CHANG BENNETT, CHINA’S SOCIALIST 
RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING 45-58 (2016). 
20 . Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and 
Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/
asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html?_r=0. 
21. Id.  
22. See generally Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS. (Sept. 7, 1990), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/
Pages/RoleOfLawyers.aspx [https://perma.cc/8SBX-BP6X]; G.A. Res. 53/144 (Mar. 8, 1999). 
23.  See PILS, supra note 13. 
24. Id.  
25. He Yang, Disbarment (吊照门) (independent documentary film, 2010). 
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for improper reasons. Lawyers have shared their early experience of 
such practices in 2004, detailing in eloquent testimony how first the 
authorities and then their own law firm bosses might instruct them not 
to represent a “politically sensitive” client.26 
The criminal justice system, too, has been used to control lawyers, 
who have historically been charged with crimes affecting the integrity 
of the judicial process, public order and national security, including 
“falsifying evidence,” “obstructing public office,” “gathering a crowd 
in a public place to obstruct order” and “[inciting] subversion of State 
power or overthrow of the socialist system.”27 As early as 2011, a 
lawyer commented: 
As long as you engage in rights defense, you may, superficially 
speaking, act within the law; but the government will never see it 
that way; for them, you attack them and shake their legitimacy 
(dongyao ta de hefaxing).28 
One of the key provisions that has been used to prosecute lawyers 
is Article 306 of the Criminal Law (“CL”), which provides for criminal 
punishment of lawyers who falsify or suppress evidence or instruct 
their clients to falsify or suppress evidence. 29 The main problem with 
Article 306 of the CL has been the retaliatory targeting of lawyers for 
trying to challenge the prosecution’s evidence, e.g., by producing 
 
26 . See, e.g., CHINA HUM. RTS. LAW. CONCERN GROUP, http://www.chrlawyers.hk/
en/content/%E9%A6%96%E9%A0%81 [https://perma.cc/SG5V-H9FQ]. Further examples are 
discussed in Pils, Chapter 5, which also discusses the problematic regulations requiring lawyers 
to submit information on their handling of ‘sensitive’ cases to the authorities. 
27. Teng Biao, The Political Meaning of the Crime of “Subverting State Power, translated 
in LIU XIAOBO, CHARTER 08 AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA (Hong Kong 
University Press, 2012). 
28. #21 2011-2 30. In Chinese characters, 动摇它的合法性. 
29. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Feb. 25, 2011, effective Mar. 1, 2011), art. 306.  
If, in criminal proceedings, a defender or agent ad litem destroys or forges evidence, 
helps any of the parties destroy or forge evidence, or coerces the witness or entices 
him into changing his testimony in defiance of the facts or give false testimony, he 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or 
criminal detention; if the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years. 
Where a witness’s testimony or other evidence provided, shown or quoted by a 
defender or agent ad litem is inconsistent with the facts but is not forged intentionally, 
it shall not be regarded as forgery of evidence.  
Article 307 CL addresses non-lawyers and stipulates different rules for charges against 
them, creating bias. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, CONG.-EXECUTIVE 
COMMISSION ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-law-of-the-
peoples-republic-of-china [https://perma.cc/48EX-L9AT] (last visited Dec. 25, 2013).  
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witness statements contradicting those of the prosecution, or 
challenging the reliability of confessions; and the provision is widely 
held to have produced a chilling effect.30 
Following the adoption of increasingly principled, autonomous 
and vocal advocacy practices by some lawyers, the authorities have 
tightened controls and the Party has sought to strengthen its role within 
law firms.31 This process, which could be observed throughout the 
Reform and Opening era, accelerated under the leadership of Xi 
Jinping, which, as I argue, abandoned the paradigm of gradual 
transition to a more liberal system, and instead introduced explicitly 
anti-liberal changes. 32   These changes have re-emphasized Party 
control of the law and weakened rule of law protections. 33  Most 
recently, they have resulted in constitutional revisions that enable Xi to 
stay in power without term limitations, while also enshrining his 
thought as guiding in the text of the Constitution.34 
The shift toward anti-liberal law initiated under Xi Jinping has 
had momentous consequences for all actors in the legal system, 
especially lawyers, whose fundamental role made them particularly 
vulnerable to being perceived as potential irritants and challengers. 
This shift is reflected, inter alia, in what Ahl has termed the 
“politicization of China’s judicial examination.”35 At the level of legal 
rules, it became important to widen the mechanisms that allowed the 
authorities to outlaw and vilify ‘rights lawyers’ as troublemakers and 
 
30.  Ng Tze-wei, Until clause goes, defense lawyers are just decoration, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (July 7, 2011), http://www.scmp.com/article/972741/until-clause-goes-
defence-lawyers-are-just-decoration [https://perma.cc/9A9P-9CMZ] (“An All China Lawyers’ 
Association officer, who asked not to be named, said in the 10 years after the clause was 
introduced in 1997, at least 200 lawyers had been detained under clause 306. At least half were 
proven innocent or not prosecuted, but those convicted faced jail terms and were disbarred for 
life.”); Mao Lixin (毛立新), ‘律师伪证罪的追诉程序探析 [Analysis of the handling of crimes 
of falsification of evidence by lawyers] (Aug. 30, 2011),  http://blog.sina.
com.cn/s/blog_4e7afe890102dssf.html [https://perma.cc/7YQB-T92U]; Ran Yanfei, When 
Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers Become the Criminals, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 988 (2009).  
31. See PILS, supra note 13 (discussing this process  through 2013, which was the 
beginning of the Xi era). 
32. Eva Pils, The Party and the Law, in HANDBOOK ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
248, 248-65 (2018). 
33.  Id. 
34 . Jerome A. Cohen, Xi Jinping amends China’s Constitution, JEROME A. COHEN: 
JERRY’S BLOG, (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/2018/3/8/xi-jinping-
amends-chinas-constitution [https://perma.cc/FD8B-GHR5]. 
35 . See generally Bjoern Ahl, The Politicization of the Chinese National Judicial 
Examination, 2007–2012, 44 MODERN CHINA 208 (2017). 
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rabble-rousers. For example, Article 309 of the CL, as revised in 2015, 
prohibits: 
[I]nsulting, defaming or threatening judicial personnel or litigation 
participants, and not heeding the court’s admonitions, seriously 
disrupting courtroom order . . . [as well as] other conduct seriously 
disrupting court order.36 
A MoJ Regulation on the Management of Law Firms, moreover, 
requires Chinese law firms to ensure that the lawyers on their staff not 
engage in too-vocal advocacy or political speech. 37  They must ensure, 
inter alia, that their lawyers do not: 
[P]ublish distorting or misleading information on cases handled by 
themselves or others, or maliciously hype up cases, . . . [that they 
not] put pressure on the authorities and attack legal authorities or 
undermine the legal system by setting up groups, producing joint 
letters, or by publishing open letters, . . . [that they not] humiliate, 
defame, threaten or beat judicial personnel or participants in a 
litigation, or engage in denial of the state-determined nature of an 
evil sect organization or other conduct seriously disrupting court 
order [sic]; . . . [and that they not] publish or disseminate speech 
that denies the political order laid down in the Constitution, denies 
fundamental principles or endangers national security, or use the 
internet or the media to stoke discontent toward the Party and 
Government.38 (Emphases added) 
In the hands of a Party-State controlled judiciary, the language of 
these newly introduced provisions is highly elastic. In practice, the use 
of these provisions is likely to complement the already available 
arsenal of criminal and other legal provisions hampering lawyers’ 
exercise of their profession. Such sweeping obligations imposed on law 
firms are all the more problematic because lawyers are in some cases 
compelled to use (otherwise arguably questionable) means such as 
open letters about pending cases and peaceful online demonstrations 
about procedural violations. They resort to such methods in order to 
 
36. China Law Translate, People’s Republic of China Criminal Law (amended 2015), 
http://chinalawtranslate.com/%e4%b8%ad%e5%8d%8e%e4%ba%ba%e6%b0%91%e5%85%
b1%e5%92%8c%e5%9b%bd%e5%88%91%e6%b3%95%ef%bc%882015%e5%b9%b4%e4%
bf%ae%e6%ad%a3%ef%bc%89/?lang=en (last visited May 31, 2018) [link broken]. 
37. 律师事务所管理办法 [Regulation on the Management of Law Firms] (promulgated 
by edict 133/2016 of the Ministry of Justice on Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5109321.htm [https://perma.cc/6UWY-
U3LF].  
38. Id.  
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overcome inherent weaknesses of the judicial process, such as 
violations of the right of access to lawyers of one’s own choice, the 
lack of publicness and openness of judicial proceedings, and what Li 
Ling has aptly described as the principle of Chinese judicial 
dependence. 39  The new rules impose an explicit obligation on law 
firms to ensure that their staff politically censor themselves. 
Noncompliance puts the firms’ registration and hence their very 
existence at risk. 
Beyond the regulatory regime and the rules of criminal law, 
lawyers who take on criminal defense cases or other cases involving 
confrontation with the Party-State’s security apparatus have always 
been at risk of wider persecution. 40  Such persecution has included 
violence. 41  In many instances, lawyers have triggered persecution 
simply by insisting on compliance with legal rules the authorities are 
unwilling to follow, such as rules safeguarding the right to file cases, 
securing their access to case files and defendants in custody.42 They 
have also been persecuted for refusals to comply with unlawful orders 
and instructions from the authorities and for complaining  about 
government illegality or criminality.43 
While Lei Yang’s, the young environmental activist, unexplained 
death in custody was a shock, it fit in with what human rights lawyers 
had learned to expect. For example, in June 2016, in Nanning, lawyer 
Wu Liangshu was beaten and had most of his business suit torn off 
when questioning the necessity of undergoing an enhanced body check 
in one of Nanning’s district courts of law.44 Perhaps more commonly, 
lawyers engaging in work that provokes the authorities will be attacked 
by persons referred to as “unknown thugs.”45 There can be a blurred 
line between these actors, a sort of obscurity which can in turn be 
exploited by the authorities. For example, the police threatened one 
 
39. Li Ling, The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial dependence in 
China, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 4 (2016). 
40 .  EVA PILS, CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE 
(2014)189-231. 
41.  Id.  
42.  Id.  
43.  Id.  
44. Stephen McDonnell, The Chinese lawyer who had his clothes ripped off in court, BBC 
NEWS: CHINA BLOG, (June 7, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-china-blog-36466485 
[https://perma.cc/5KZF-U7W8]. The article contains a picture of Lawyer Wu wearing the 
remnants of his suit with his bare leg and underpants showing. 
45. Li Jiayu, Mob storms into hotel, beats up two defense lawyers, GLOBAL TIMES, (July 
20, 2011), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/666978.shtml [https://perma.cc/3BMK-J7JU]. 
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lawyer explicitly with “being Lei Yang’ed” if he failed to comply with 
instructions; he bravely reported this later via social media.46 
As already mentioned, moreover, some lawyers have been 
subjected to even more severe measures such as enforced 
disappearance and torture, as well as criminal convictions and 
incarceration under various detention systems (the line between these 
two is becoming increasingly blurred).47 I discussed the example of 
lawyer Gao Zhisheng eleven years ago in these pages.48 A pioneer of 
human rights lawyering in China, he later suffered brutal torture and 
long-term detention at the hands of the police, who, on the occasion of 
his first torture experience told him that he would be given the same 
“treatment” as the clients he had sought to defend by exposing their 
torture in open letters published online.49 
The use of state-centered violence, too, has intensified under Xi 
Jinping, which saw a particularly severe and extensive lawyer 
crackdown that is still ongoing as of this writing.50 Beginning in July 
2015, some three hundred lawyers and legal assistants were rounded 
up and subjected to coercive questioning by the authorities. 51  The 
majority were released after promising not to advocate on behalf of  a 
small number of lawyers subjected to secret detention, some of whom 
were later convicted of political crimes.52 Of those who were forcibly 
disappeared or held under extremely permissive rules on “residential 
surveillance in a designated location,” some, such as lawyer Wang 
 
46. Social media post, on file with the Author.  
47.  See PILS, supra note 40. 
48. Eva Pils, Asking the Tiger for His Skin: Rights Activism in China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J., 1209-87 (2006) 
49. Gao Zhisheng (高智晟), Dark Night, Dark Hood, and Kidnapping by Dark Mafia – 
(my account of more than 50 days of torture in 2007), SINA (Mar. 10, 2009, 12:07 AM),  
http://blog.sina.com.tw/64777/article.php?pbgid=64777&entryid=595609&comopen=1&track
open=1 [https://perma.cc/A9NE-DN63]. 
50. Wang Yu, The Nightmare – An Excerpt of Lawyer Wang Yu’s account of 709 detention 
and Torture, CHINA CHANGE (Nov. 13, 2017), https://chinachange.org/2017/11/13/the-
nightmare-an-excerpt-of-lawyer-wang-yus-account-of-709-detention-and-torture/ 
[https://perma.cc/X57C-2JMM].  
51. A Year On China’s Crackdown On Human Rights Lawyers, AMNESTY INT’L (June 22, 
2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/07/one-year-since-chinas-crack
down-on-human-rights-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/6JPG-X9RY]. 
52. Fu Hualing, The July 9th (709) Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers: Legal Advocacy 
in an Authoritarian State, 112 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 554 (2018); Eva Pils, China’s turn to public 
repression: the case of the 709 Crackdown on human rights lawyers, 3 CHINA L. SOC’Y REV. 1, 
1-47 (forthcoming 2018). 
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Quanzhang, have not come back at all yet as of this writing.53 Among 
those who came back, or were formally punished and could be visited 
in prison, Li Chunfu, was diagnosed with serious mental illness the 
following day. 54 A few days later, lawyer Xie Yang provided a detailed 
account of his torture to his defense lawyer, who decided to publish the 
news.55 By July 2017, it had emerged that some six detainees claimed 
to have been forcibly drugged. One of them commented in a 
conversation in July 2017 that the forced drugging, in particular: 
. . . made you think you were finished . . . you couldn’t know 
[what you’d been given] and so you thought, for sure they want to 
kill you. You won’t get out of here alive. It was only in there that 
I really understood what torture was.56 
The same month, lawyer Wang Yu released a statement in which 
she described how she had been kept confined, deprived of food, and 
tormented in various other ways during her detention.57 Releasing this 
statement no doubt took great courage. It was also a step in a process 
of recovery from what the authorities had put her through.  Like others,  
Wang Yu had been wheeled out in front of television cameras, where 
they had to talk about their ‘crimes,’ admit guilt, profess to repentance, 
and praise and thank the Party-State authorities.58 
Wang Yu, having been detained for over a year “on suspicion of 
state subversion,” spoke to the media in what appeared to be a holiday 
resort, renouncing her former advocacy denouncing two foreign 
 
53. China human rights: Wife marches for 'vanished' husband, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2018), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43644599 [https://perma.cc/B8GA-XU7K]. 
54. Wang Qiaoling, Chinese Rights Lawyer Li Chunfu Mentally Disturbed and Physically 
Ruined After Abuse in Custody, CHINA CHANGE (Jan. 13, 2017), https://chinachange.org/
2017/01/13/chinese-rights-lawyer-li-chunfu-mentally-disturbed-and-physically-ruined-after-
abuse-in-custody/ [https://perma.cc/6HEP-CG56]. 
55. Xie Yang & Chen Jiangang, Transcript of Interviews with Lawyer Xie Yang (3) – 
Dangling Chair, Beating, Threatening Lives of Loved Ones, and Framing Others, CHINA 
CHANGE (Jan. 21, 2017), https://chinachange.org/2017/01/21/transcript-of-interviews-with-
lawyer-xie-yang-3-dangling-chair-beating-threatening-lives-of-loved-ones-and-framing-
others/?. 
56. Eva Pils, A new torture in China, ASIA DIALOGUE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://cpianalysis.
org/2017/08/10/a-new-torture-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/4DLJ-4KBJ]. 
57. Wang Yu, 王宇、包龙军：致敬！“709”案辩护人 [Wang Yu, Bao Longjun: Saluting 
the “709” criminal defenders!], BOTAN WEB (July 12, 2017),  https://botanwang.com/
articles/201707/%E7%8E%8B%E5%AE%87%E6%9B%9D%E5%85%89%E9%85%B7%E5
%88%91%E3%80%80%E6%84%9F%E8%B0%A2%E5%85%B3%E6%B3%A8%E4%BF%8
3%E5%A4%84%E5%A2%83%E6%94%B9%E5%96%84.html [https://perma.cc/V9NW-
EA7X]. 
58.  See Pils supra, note 56.  
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organizations59 for human rights awards given to her earlier that year, 
and thanking and praising the authorities. Her boss, Zhou Shifeng, at 
his trial, similarly admitted guilt and spoke of his deep gratitude toward 
the authorities that had already broadcast his statement of repentance 
shortly after his initial detention and held him incommunicado for over 
a year.60 To prepare for this strange performance, the authorities had 
placed Zhou under “residential surveillance in a designated location” 
without access to legal counsel, ensured his ‘representation’ by a 
lawyer they had chosen and procured a note, handwritten by Zhou, 
stating that he did not wish his family to attend the trial.61 Another 
 
59. Namely, the American Bar Association and the Ludovic Trarieux Human Rights Prize 
Committee. Chinachange James Podgers, Chinese lawyer Wang Yu given ABA International 
Human Rights Award in absentia, ABA JOURNAL, 6 (Aug. 6, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chinese_lawyer_wang_yu_given_inaugural_aba_inter
national_human_rights_award;  The XXIst Ludovic Trarieux International Human Rights Prize 
2016, LUDOVIC TRARIEUX,  http://www.ludovictrarieux.org/uk-page3.callplt2016.htm; China 
Change, “My son is everything to me:” how China forced lawyer Wang Yu to denounce her 
human rights award, H.K. FREE PRESS (May 13,  2018), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/
05/13/son-everything-china-forced-lawyer-wang-yu-denounce-human-rights-award/.  
60.  Esteemed Presiding Judge, judges, state prosecutors and my two esteemed 
defense lawyers: you have all been put to so much trouble! Through todays trial, I 
have come to realize fully what crimes I have committed, and the harm my actions 
have caused to the Party and the Government. I hereby express my deepest repentance 
toward our government! [Bows.] I trust that a trial so replete with fairness and justice 
and the rule of law as this will result in a fair verdict, and that it shall stand the test of 
history and legal scrutiny. I admit guilt and repent, admit guilt and subject myself to 
the law; and I will never appeal!.  . . . I thank the court! I thank the prosecutor! I thank 
my lawyers!  
See Annotated Excerpts from Hu Shigen and Zhou Shifeng’s Trial Transcripts, HUM. RTS 
IN CHINA (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.hrichina.org/en/annotated-excerpts-hu-shigen-and-zhou-
shifengs-trial-transcripts [https://perma.cc/XDS2-NT98]. See also Vivienne Zeng, Human 
rights lawyers targeted in unprecedented crackdown, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (July 13, 2015), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2015/07/13/human-rights-lawyers-targeted-in-unprecedented-
crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/8PUF-LEDH]. Some commentators thought Zhou was 
intentionally ironic.   
 
In a 10-minute final statement, the Peking University law school master’s degree 
holder praised China’s legal system, saying it was “so much beyond the Western rule 
of law,” and that the trial would “stand the test of the world.” The praise was not 
included in the official transcript published hours later. 
 
See, e.g., Jun Mai, How Chinese rights lawyer’s courtroom mea culpa went off script, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/2006700/how-chinese-rights-lawyers-courtroom-mea-culpa-went 
[https://perma.cc/KR63-AQVD]. 
61. Zhou Shifeng (周世锋), 天津二中院：周世锋向法院书面请求不希望亲友旁听庭
审 [Tianjin Second Intermediate Court: Zhou Shfeng submits written request to the Court, 
stating that he does not wish for family and friends to audit his trial], PEOPLE’S NETWORK (Aug. 
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lawyer described at length how his own trial was negotiated, scripted 
and, indeed, rehearsed, even though it was not selected for a “TV 
trial.” 62  The effects of the TV trials were further amplified by 
accompanying articles in the official news media, as well as further 
audio-visual materials officially circulated video-clips that cast human 
rights advocates as enemies of the People and the State.63 
Of course, the vast majority of lawyers, and in particular those in 
commercial practice, are not affected by the more intense repressive 
measures outlined here Their professional experience, especially if, 
like the vast majority of lawyers, they do not take on criminal cases, is 
removed from that of the human rights lawyers who fall victim to  
persecution. Contrary to how the Chinese and international legal 
profession in China tend to be discussed by professionals and 
academics, there is no neat and clear dividing line. There can be no 
such line, not least because legal work does not always neatly fall into 
separate categories. Many cases can engage the abuse-prone criminal 
justice and/or Party investigation system or become ‘sensitive’ for 
variety of other reasons. Even in the absence of such connections the 
Party-State system deliberately uses the social and professional 
networks on which lawyers depend to influence their actions. For 
example, it uses the law firm and its head as a tool to pass on 
instructions to individual lawyers, as when it instructs a ‘boss’ to 
demand that a particular law firm employee cease to represent a 
particular client. 
Indeed, there is every indication that the control of the legal 
profession is not only intensifying with regard to perceived 
‘subversive’ elements within the profession, but also being extended 
further to all its members, as a few further examples of new practices 
will illustrate. The first, perhaps most powerful and pervasive way in 
which this is achieved is through the licensing system, which affects all 
lawyers.64 In a situation where, by nearly everyone’s admission, by 
anecdotal accounts and according to official statements, corruption in 
the judicial profession and more widely amongst actors in the legal 
 
3, 2016), http://legal.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0803/c42510-28608968.html [https://perma.cc/
4A7E-4BD8]  
62. Anonymous conversation #300-17-1. 
63. 林乐媛, 颜色革命 Color Revolution (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=8qBt-i9ErSY. English translation available at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/08/hk-
activist-branded-us-backed-separatist-govt-video/. 
64.  See PILS, supra note 13.  
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system, has long been endemic, lawyers’ independence from the Party-
State is adversely affected as it makes them vulnerable.65 Scholars 
investigating how corruption affects the legal profession have, for 
example, described practice of “nurturing judges” (yang faguan) – 
potentially meaning anything from taking them to restaurants to money 
bribes – as widespread, and viewed as common and acceptable, at least 
in some locations. 66 For example, lawyers encounter a world of ‘state 
capitalism’ where legal rules of corporate governance are routinely 
disrupted by the Party exercising control. 67  Defenders of the strict 
licensing system requiring an annual re-assessment to keep one’s 
license might contend that it is necessary to weed out corrupt lawyers. 
But from the perspective taken here, this system is itself corrupted, in 
ways indicated above; it is incompatible with rule of law principles. 
Second, partly claiming to respond to malpractices in the legal 
profession and wider legal system, the authorities are rolling out ever 
more comprehensive programs of surveillance include the so-called 
Social Credit System.68 Once this program is in place nationwide, all 
lawyers, along with all other Chinese citizens, will be given a ‘social 
 
65. Commenting on corruption within China’s court system, Supreme People’s Court 
President Zhou Qiang said, for example, that “the situation is grim and the task arduous.” In 
March 2016, after a year in which, according to the same official report, a total of 2,424 judicial 
staff were investigated and punished over graft, he said, “we will continue to put high pressure 
on corruption.” Every year, the Annual Work Report by the Supreme People’s Court President 
(see, e.g., Zhou Qiang (周强 ), 最高人民法院工作报告— ——2017年 3月 12日在第十二届
全国人民代表大会第五次会议上 [Supreme People’s Work Report —- submitted at the Fifth 
Plenary Meeting of the Twelfth NPC on 12 March 2017], The Supreme People’s Court of the 
People’s Republic of China (Mar. 19, 2017), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
37852.html) includes a rundown of disciplinary procedures, investigations, prosecutions and 
convictions for judicial corruption-related crimes, such as “bending the law” and bribe-taking; 
and professional judges have been quitting in rather large numbers. See 法官离职潮背后:丰满
的理想抵挡不住现实骨感 [What lies behind the wave of judges quitting: fine ideals cannot 
withstand sense of realism], SINA.COM (July 24, 2016), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2016-07-
24/doc-ifxuhukz0907342.shtml [https://perma.cc/2EFK-N23W]. 
66 . Outside litigation contexts, the situation is not necessarily better. See Sida Liu, 
Lawyers, State Officials, and Significant Others: Symbiotic Exchange in the Chinese Legal 
Services Market, 206 CHINA Q. 276, 276-93 (2011); see also TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & SIDA 
LIU, CRIMINAL DEFENCE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK (2016). 
67. JiangYu Wang, Corporate Governance in China: The Law and Its Political Logic, in  
Routledge Handbook of Corporate Law 183-211 (Roman Tomasic ed., 2017) 
68. Yongxi Chen & Anne S.Y. Cheung, The Transparent Self Under Big Data Profiling: 
Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System, 12 J. COMP. L. UNIV. H.K. 356 
(2017); Jeremy Daum, China’s Social Credit System, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/01/giving-credit-jeremy-daum-chinas-social-credit-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/DZJ8-UTYE]; Merics, China’s Social Credit System, CHINA MONITOR (May 
24, 2017),  https://www.merics.org/en/microsite/china-monitor/chinas-social-credit-system. 
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credit’ score by the State, and this score will affect questions such as 
whether they can travel abroad. 69  (An additional issue is the 
government’s plans “to rank lawyers by seniority and restrict [the 
handling of] key cases to ‘qualified’ advocates.”)70 
Lastly, the Party has not only pursued a goal of achieving “total 
coverage” of Chinese law firms’ establishment of Party branches 
through “professional Party-building work.”71 As the abovementioned 
MoJ Regulation indicates, Chinese lawyers and law firms are 
increasingly required to aid the Party-State in ensuring political self-
censorship.72 Through extensive reporting obligations in the context of 
the re-assessment system as well as the penetration of law firms by the 
Party, the wider Chinese legal profession is thus also affected by a 
process of intensified “politicization,” or intensified Party control. 
In sum, the arsenal of rules and measures by which the Party-State 
controls the domestic Chinese legal profession is impressive, and it has 
been further extended under Xi Jinping. The suggestion that lawyer 
repression in China limited to a handful of marginalized human rights 
lawyers is inaccurate, and there are plenty of trajectories whereby 
undue pressure on legal professionals is extended to the wider, 
including the commercial legal profession. International lawyers 
coming to China might thus face many calls on their sense of solidarity 
and responsibility for upholding the autonomy of the legal profession. 
As the following section discusses, however, the system gives them 
many reasons to stay silent.  
III. TRANSNATIONAL IMPLICATION 
When foreign lawyers go to work in China, they come under the 
jurisdiction of domestic Chinese law. When Chinese lawyers work 
abroad, they are required to obey local laws, too. In both cases, 
however, they do not entirely shed the system of their jurisdiction of 
origin; foreign lawyers generally remain bound by certain professional 
 
69. Jay Stanley, China’s Nightmarish Citizen Scores Are a Warning For Americans, AM.  
C.L. UNION (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/consumer-
privacy/chinas-nightmarish-citizen-scores-are-warning-americans?redirect=blog/free-future/
chinas-nightmarish-citizen-scores-are-warning-americans [https://perma.cc/97TY-JSZX]. 
70. Jun Mai, Justice fears over reform plans to rank China’s lawyers, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/
1880166/plan-chinese-lawyers-be-ranked-sparks-fears-over [ https://perma.cc/47RN-DVJP]. 
71. See PILS, supra note 13.  
72. See PILS, supra note 40. 
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standards grounded in the values of the legal system that admitted them 
to the profession. Chinese lawyers remain bound not only by the rules 
of their profession narrowly speaking; they also retain their status as 
subjects of the Party-State and remain in important ways subject to its 
control73 As shown in the previous Section, such control and influence 
take a variety of forms, not all of which are legal even on the terms of 
the domestic Chinese legal system.74 Moreover, domestically, lawyers 
and law firms can be both victims and complicit supporters of 
repression. The Chinese system’s transnational effects in some ways 
reflect its domestic traits. In particular, foreign lawyers and law firms, 
too, are at risk of becoming complicit in the repressive system, even 
though a special system of rules has been devised for them, and even 
though they are barred from directly competing with their Chinese 
peers. 
The regulatory regime governing foreign law firms in China is 
based on the 2001 Regulation on the Management of Representative 
Offices of Foreign Law Firms in China (“Representative Office 
Regulation”) and its 2002 Interpretation Rules. 75  Formally, the 
Representative Office Regulations are secondary legislation, and are 
also governed by the 2007 Law on Lawyers (Article 58).76 Under these 
rules, any international law firm setting up an office in China will be 
required to go through a licensing system for setting up a 
representation; and it cannot “practice Chinese law,” not even by 
employing Chinese lawyer staff. 
 
73. This includes registration and reporting requirements. See, e.g., ‘关于提供律师事务
所在境外设立分支机构详细信息的通知  [notice on supplying detailed information on 
establishment of law firm branches abroad],’ GZLAWYER.COM (Apr. 12, 2017), 
http://www.gzlawyer.org/info/0c0ee283b9dc4734822c70d1f750acd9 [https://perma.cc/5JWZ-
5BSJ]. See also infra note 88 (discussing the Belt and Road Initiative).  
74.  See Jiayu, supra note 45. 
75. 外国律师事务所驻华代表机构管理条例 [Regulations on the Administration of 
Foreign Law Firms’ Representative Offices in China] LAWINFOCHINA.COM (2001), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=2169 [https://perma.cc/5XNA-J5C2]; 
司法部关于执行《外国律师事务所驻华代表机构管理条例》的规定 [Provisions of the 
Ministry of Justice on the Execution of the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Law 
Firms’ Representative Offices in China], LAWINFOCHINA.COM, http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?lib=law&id=2402&CGid. Law firms based in Hong Kong and Macau—which are 
separate jurisdictions from mainland China—are  subject to similar rules, see The People’s 
Republic of China Law on Lawyers, supra note 13. 
76. The People’s Republic of China Law on Lawyers, supra note 13. 
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The Representative Office Regulation requires that such 
representative offices and individual representatives (lawyers) shall, 
inter alia: 
respect Chinese laws, regulations and rules, abide by Chinese 
lawyers’ professional ethics and professional discipline, and not 
harm China’s national security or social public interests. 
(emphasis added)77  
The language of “professional ethics and professional discipline” 
creates a link to domestic standards. Domestic lawyers found guilty of 
breaches may face punishment under the Ministry of Justice “Measures 
for Punishment of Unlawful Acts by Lawyers and Law Firms” ( 
“Measures for Punishment”).78 Misconduct by foreign lawyers would 
be dealt with in accordance with Articles 24 and 31 of the the 
Representative Office Regulation. 79  It stipulates that when foreign 
lawyers engage in conduct endangering national security or public 
order or “social management order” (a vague term), they too may be 
subject to criminal or administrative punishment, although it does not 
specify under what administrative rules.80 
What is perhaps of more immediate practical relevance is that all 
lawyers working in such representative offices are barred from actually 
engaging in “practicing Chinese law.” 81  In practice, it is virtually 
impossible to operate in China without in some way engaging in an 
interpretation of Chinese law while providing services to clients. Any 
specific activity may or may not constitute “provision of Chinese law 
services” 82  – what matters, according to informal and confidential 
conversations held with foreign lawyers of over ten years of experience 
of practicing in law firm offices in China, is that this requirement hangs 
 
77. Regulations on Administration of Foreign Law Firms' Representative Offices in China 
(promulgated by State Council of the People's Republic of China on Dec. 22, 2001, effective 
Jan. 1, 2002), art. 3 [hereinafter the Representative Office Regulation]. 
78 . Ministry of Justice, ‘律师和律师事务所违法行为处罚办法  [Measures for 
Punishment of Unlawful Acts by Lawyers and Law Firms] (promulgated on  April 8, 2010, 
effective  June 1, 2010), MINISTRY OF JUST. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 10, 
2010), http://www.moj.gov.cn/government_public/content/2010-04/10/fggz_6422.html [https
://perma.cc/9PVJ-VJ3K].    
79.  Representative Office Regulation, art. 24. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Article 15 of the Representative Office Regulation lists the activities they are allowed 
to engage in, explicitly excepting “Chinese law services Zhongguo falü shiwu.” Id. art. 15. 
82. On detailed questions, see, e.g., Andrew Godwin, The Professional ‘Tug of War’: The 
Regulation of Foreign Lawyers in China, Business Scope Issues and Some Suggestions for 
Reform, 33 MELB U.L. REV. 132 (2009). 
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“like a sword of Damocles” over each Representative Office.83 Falling 
afoul of the requirement can result in suspension or revocation 
(zhuxiao, diaoxiao) of the license (permit) to practice.84 One lawyer 
observed that they did not think that any effective legal challenges to 
license revocation or means of redress would be available in practice 
in such a case.85 Low confidence in the possibility of challenging unfair 
interpretations of such rules, due to the weak rule of law environment, 
can only enhance their chilling effect.86  
Partly in response to such pressure, but mainly for wider 
commercial reasons, a growing number of foreign law firms is creating 
loosely structured mergers.87 There is, for example, the form of the 
Swiss Verein.88 The Verein merger retains separate local profit pools 
for the two entities (the Chinese and foreign firms). 89  The verein 
 
83.  Anonymous conversation #400-17-1.  
83. In accordance with Article 26 (1) of the Representative Office Regulation, see 
Representative Office Regulation, supra note 77, art. 26(1). 
85.  Anonymous conversation #400-16-1.  
86. Whether the current restrictions imposed on foreign lawyers and law firms in a legal 
services market perspective are in compliance with China’s international obligations, in 
particular under World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules, has been a matter of debate for some 
time. After China’s accession to the WTO, some argued that the WTO presented challenges to 
the domestic legal services market,  and that China was deviating from its WTO commitments. 
See Jane Heller, China’s New Foreign Law Firm Regulations: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 
12 PAC. RIM. L & POL’Y J. 751, 765 (2003); see also Rachel E. Stern & Su Li, The Outpost 
Office: How International Law Firms Approach the China Market, 41 L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 
184 (2016). The focus of the present discussion is not on restrictions of the legal services market 
as such but, rather, on the effects existing restrictions have on the autonomy of the legal 
profession. 
87.  Anna Zhang, Will More Law Firms Look to Joint Ventures For China Business?, ALM 
(Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/10/24/will-more-law-firms-look-to-
joint-ventures-for-china-business/?kw=Will%20More%20Law%20Firms%20Look%20to%20
Joint%20Ventures%20For%20China%20Business?&et=editorial&bu=International&cn=2016
1024&src=EMC-Email&pt=Asian%20Lawyer%20News&pc=ASLNALERT&slreturn=2016
0926100151 [https://perma.cc/3EVU-D9Z2]. 
88. A representative example for this sort of merger is that of Dentons and Dacheng. The 
firm in China now uses both names ( 大 成 ). See DENTONS DACHENG, 
https://www.dentons.com/zh [https://perma.cc/5UFH-6G2U] (last visited June 3, 2018). 
89. A verein is an association of independent legal entities for specifically defined 
purposes — generally, marketing and branding in nature. Financial separation and 
local entity independence of control for each verein member law firm is confirmed in 
the verein’s governing documents, and reaffirmed in dedicated disclaimer and notice 
sections prominently featured on the website of every verein member, along with the 
important note that the verein itself does not practice law anywhere. 
 
See Edwin B. Reeser & Martin J. Foley, Are verein-style law firms ignoring the fee-splitting 
ethics rules?, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/are_verein-
style_law_firms_ignoring_fee-splitting_ethics_rules/ [https://perma.cc/8HRN-GPK2]. 
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structure cannot necessarily avoid reputational liability for one’s 
partner, however. 
Some new local regulations have created further opportunities for 
Chinese and foreign law firms to create joint offices. In particular, 
administrative regulations created by the Shanghai Bureau of Justice, 
allow for what is called “reciprocal assignment” (hupai) of legal 
consultants between a Chinese and a foreign firm, and for “affiliated 
operation” (lianying) of a Chinese and a foreign firm.90 These new 
opportunities would appear to reduce the risks of “providing Chinese 
law services” by normalizing such activities but also bring some new 
problems, since there would be even greater proximity to the 
obligations and liabilities of domestic Chinese lawyers, and thus 
greater risks of complicity with Party-State illegality or crime. 
In parallel with this, the interaction between domestic and foreign 
lawyers and law firms has come within the ambit of Xi Jiniping’s 
global expansion project called the “Belt and Road Initiative” 
(“BRI”).91 This initiative has not only led to ambitious attempts to re-
model law on anti-liberal les and weaken the international human rights 
law regime by reinterpreting its fundamentals, such as human rights.92 
It has also led to numerous subordinate initiatives and organizations 
including a new “’Belt and Road’ Cross-border Lawyers” Talent Pool 
 
90. See 中国（上海）自由贸易试验区中外律师事务所互派律师担任法律顾问的实
施办法 [Measures for the Implementation of the Reciprocal Assignment of Lawyers to Serve as 
Legal Consultants by Chinese and Foreign Law Firms in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone] (promulgated by the Shanghai Bureau of Justice,  People's Gov’t of Shanghai Mun., 
effective Nov. 18, 2014) (addressing what is called the “reciprocal assignment” (hupai 互派) of 
legal consultants between a Chinese and a foreign firm); 中国（上海）自由贸易试验区中外
律师事务所联营的实施办法 [Measures of the Implementation of Affiliated Operation between 
Chinese and Foreign Law Firms in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone] (promulgated 
by the Shanghai Bureau of Justice,  People's Gov’t of Shanghai Mun., effective Dec. 21, 2014)  
(involving the “affiliated operation” (lianying 联营) of the Chinese and a foreign firm).  
91. See Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China’s Contribution, BELT 
AND ROAD FORUM (May 11, 2017), https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12731.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KJS2-MFRZ].  
92. See ‘首届”南南人权论坛”《北京宣言》[First South-South human rights dialogue 
“Beijing Declaration”], XINHUA NET (Dec. 8, 2018), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-
12/08/c_1122081753.htm [https://perma.cc/R3AT-2WWC]; see also 常驻联合国日内瓦办事
处俞建华大使 [Ambassador Yu Jianhua of the Chinese Mission to the United Nations Office 
at Geneva], 坚持合作共赢 共促人权发展 [Win-Win Cooperation for the Common Cause of 
Human Rights],  PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/dszlsjt_673036/t1538415.shtml (May 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
RS35-F2FW],  translated in PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS OFF. AT GENEVA AND OTHER INT’L ORG. IN SWITZ., (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://www.china-un.ch/chn/dbtzyhd/t1538411.htm [https://perma.cc/A22R-FULP]. 
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whose establishment indicates that ACLA, as an organization of the 
Party-State, intends to play a key role in the selection of foreign lawyers 
invited to participate in BRI projects.93 
In sum, international law firms in China operate at the sufferance 
of authorities that have become increasingly intolerant of autonomous 
legal practice over the past few years. They are required to follow a 
rule of “not practicing Chinese law” that stifles their activities and 
makes them vulnerable to pressure.94 While the regulatory framework 
is somewhat obscure, these firms moreover seem to be subjected to 
explicit requirements to ensure that their staff censor themselves 
politically, avoiding any criticism of the government or the system 
under which they operate.95 Taking these factors into account, it is 
perhaps not surprising that when the authorities launched their latest, 
and thus far biggest, crackdown on Chinese human rights lawyers, The 
American Lawyer reported, “In China’s crackdown on rights lawyers, 
big law says little.”96 (In fact, it appears that Big Law said nothing at 
all publicly, leaving expressions of concern and protest to be produced 
by professional associations and their representatives.) 
There are several problem areas of international (or transnational) 
legal services with a China element.  
The first is (client) confidentiality, an issue encompassing 
different sets of rules that govern contractual obligations of 
confidentiality, professional ethics regarding privileged information, 
 
93 . The initiative is described as follows: “At the event, the All China Lawyers 
Association announced the establishment of a ‘Belt and Road’ Cross-border Lawyers Talent 
Pool. 143 Chinese and foreign law firms and 205 Chinese and foreign lawyers became the Pools’ 
inaugural members. It is reported that ACLA will further refine its management on the basis of 
different national systems and areas of professional specialization and actively recommend 
outstanding foreign legal service personnel to participate in the assessment and arbitration 
organizations [评审、仲裁机构] of international economic and trade organizations, and to 
recommend foreign legal personnel to participate in investment in Chinese enterprises in 
countries and regions along the ‘One Belt and One Road’”. 中国律协与”一带一路”沿线多国
搭建法律服务合作网 [The All China Lawyers Association and the “One Belt, One Road” 
Multinational State Building Legal Services Cooperation Network], XINHUA NET (June 24, 
2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-06/24/c_1121203227.htm [https://perma.cc/6B
2N-BBVQ]. 
94. See Zhang, supra note 87. 
95. See id. 
96. In China’s crackdown on rights lawyers, big law says little, THE AM. LAW., (July 24, 
2015), https://www.law.com/almID/1202733049955/?slreturn=20180127060251 [https://
perma.cc/M2U2-739G]. In fact, it appears that Big Law said nothing at all publicly, leaving 
expressions of concern and protest to be produced by professional associations and their 
representatives.  
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and data protection and privacy rights. Lawyers pointed out that 
electronic surveillance and data-selling are rife in China, and that 
Chinese law firms in general feel unable to refuse requests to relinquish 
information to the police or other authorities requesting them.97 As a 
result, the promises made to clients that their information could be kept 
confidential may be spurious.98 Academics, on the other hand, point to 
the generally weak legal protection in this area. Thus Chen and Cheung 
write that: 
. . . [P]ersonal data as a general subject has yet to be clearly defined 
and effectively protected under Chinese law [and that] rights that 
data subjects are entitled to under a personal data protection 
regime are rarely mentioned in China and are, at best, provided for 
under scattered sector-specific laws . . . Given the inadequate 
protection afforded to personal data in China, the country is an 
ideal social laboratory for big data experimentation, data 
intelligence and mass surveillance.99 
Discussing the already-mentioned ‘Social Credit’ system being 
rolled out, these authors point out that the authorities in charge can 
gather records also from ‘industry associations,’ which may well be 
understood to include the lawyers’ associations at various levels as well 
as receive information supplied by private individuals. They also 
discuss the many ways in which private entities may gain access to and 
use information on ‘social credit’ or ‘public credit’ gathered in this 
way. 100  Additionally, it is recognized that the Party-State uses 
technology to practice involuntary cyber-surveillance.101 Even though 
it is impossible at this stage to gain a detailed understanding of the 
practices that may arise under these Party-State policies and practices, 
it is not difficult to see that both the provision and the use of ‘public 
credit information’ may be in tension with the obligations of lawyers 
and law firms under rules devoted to protecting confidentiality, 
privacy, and personal data, both with regard to clients, and with regard 
to employees and colleagues. 
 
97. Anonymous conversation #401-16-1. 
98. Id.  
99. Yongxi Chen & Anne S.Y. Cheung,   The Transparent Self Under Big Data Profiling: 
Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System,  12 J. COMP. L. 356, 357 (2017). 
100. Id. at 366-71 
101 . See Maya Wang, China’s Dystopian Push to Revolutionize Surveillance, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-
post/wp/2017/08/18/chinas-dystopian-push-to-revolutionize-surveillance/?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.29fadb8f24b0. 
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It is imaginable that such issues might arise with regard to foreign 
law firms operating in China, as well as with regard to Chinese law 
firms operating in western countries. To give a randomly chosen 
example of the latter case, lawyers working with King & Wood 
Malleson are listed as working in both the London and Shanghai 
branches of the firm.102 Of course, the Shanghai branch of this firm has 
established a Party cell.103 It is not possible, without insider knowledge, 
to determine what the role of this Party cell is, what decisions, if any, 
it makes or passes on from the higher echelons of the Party leadership, 
what study sessions it organizes, and overall what the influence of the 
Party on the operation of the law firm is. But there can be no doubt that 
having a Party cell has a powerful symbolic significance, at least. It 
might serve to remind lawyers licensed under the Chinese system of 
their legal obligation to show loyalty to the Party and to serve a system 
in which the principle of Party leadership has been declared to be 
identical with the principle of “socialist rule of law with Chinese 
characteristics.”104 
A second issue is the interaction of transnational law firms with 
inherently abusive systems of discipline and criminal punishment in 
China. For example, there have been cases in which the criminal justice 
system was apparently abused by commercial actors seeking to put 
pressure on competitors or opponents. 105 In China, the issue is 
recognized and discussed as one of “turning private conflicts into 
criminal cases.” 106  It can involve, for example, taking a business 
competitor or opponent in a business lawsuit into police custody as a 
 
102 . See KING & WOOD MALLESONS, http://www.kwm.com/en/cn [https://perma.cc/
F8R5-ZLD5].  
103. Lüxinshe (律新社), 献礼十九大！上海哪 33 家律所的党建工作走在了前列？
[Tribute to the Nineteenth [Party Congress]! Which 33 Shanghai Law Firms are at the Forefront 
of Party-Building Work?], (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.lvxinweb.cn/detail.aspx?wid=35&aid=
6135&openid=loseopenid [https://perma.cc/PR8P-6W7B]. 
103. CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Several Major Issues in 
Comprehensively Advancing Governance According to Law, CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Oct. 28, 
2014), http://chinalawtranslate.com/fourth-plenum-decision/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/9S5E-
7F3T]. 
105.  One such case affected a German businessman residing in China. See Kunstspediteur 
darf Deutschland wieder verlassen, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/inhaftierter-nils-jennrich-deutscher-kunstspediteur-
darf-china-verlassen-1.1677561 [https://perma.cc/T8RW-U6LC]. 
106. Yu Lujuan & Zheng Weihong (于禄娟 郑伟红), 民事纠纷刑事化的根源及对策 
[Root causes and responses to the practice of turning private conflicts into criminal cases], 
PEOPLE’S TRIBUNE, (Jan. 11, 2013), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2013-01/11/content_
1195145.htm?div=-1 [https://perma.cc/B567-C5WK].  
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“favor” from the police; 107  under the revised rules of criminal 
procedure, this might include the use of “residential surveillance in a 
designated location” or, as it has been dubbed, “non-residential 
residential surveillance” of the target individual. Where such practices 
do occur, they can raise the very difficult question of how far legal 
representatives should go in exposing or challenging them. 
The abuses, detailed earlier, against professional lawyer 
colleagues are different yet raise somewhat similar issues and may 
serve as a second example. Even where a lawyer or law firm has no 
obligations toward a detainee as a client they may have obligations of 
care or solidarity as an employer or colleague. Yet, the system provides 
many incentives against exposure or challenges, and incentives for 
participation in persecution, as has been discussed elsewhere. To give 
just one example, when human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang tried to 
expose abuses occurring in the Party-governed system for “discipline 
and inspection” typically affecting Party members, such as officials or 
CEOs of SOEs, who are suspected of corruption, he suffered severe 
persecution himself.108  
Due to the complexity and obscurity of abuses in the criminal 
justice system and parallel systems for discipline and punishment, it 
may be difficult to establish big law firms’ implication in abuses. But 
as the example, discussed at the outset, of lawyer Peng Jiyue’s attempt 
to help in the Lei Yang case illustrated, commercial law firms are not 
isolated against criminal injustices just by virtue of their status.109 Their  
dependence on the goodwill of the authorities for permission to operate, 
moreover, exposes them to the same control techniues as other lawyers 
in China, once they have become involved in a “sensitive” case.110  
 
107 . For a somewhat conservative analysis illustrating that the problem is widely 
recognized, see Yu Lujuan & Zheng Weihong (于禄娟, 郑伟红), 民事纠纷刑事化的根源及对
策 [Turning private conflicts into criminal ones – causes and ways of tackling the issue], 
PEOPLE’S TRIBUNE (Nov. 1, 2013),  http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2013-01/11/content_
1195145.htm?div=-1 [https://perma.cc/RSB9-PNB6]; see also Xu Xin (徐昕), ‘在刑事法庭解
决民事纠纷，是法治的灾难 [Resolving civil disputes through criminal litigation is a disaster 
for the rule of], SOHU (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.sohu.com/a/204495601_570256 
[https://perma.cc/BUG4-JA2B]. 
108 . See JMSC HKU, Interview on “Ningyuan Shuanggui”by Pu Zhiqiang (English 
Subtitles), VIMEO (Aug. 21, 2014), https://vimeo.com/104070378 [https://perma.cc/882Z-
D94Y]; see also Tom Phillips, Pu Zhiqiang given three-year suspended sentence, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2015),  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/pu-zhiqiang-
chinese-human-rights-lawyer-sentenced-to-three-years [https://perma.cc/3SVJ-T3PH]. 
109.  See Henochowitz, supra note 1; Fangping, supra note 1.  
110.  See supra Part II (discussing the control of the legal profession).  
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A third issue is potential threats arising from widely endemic 
corruption, be it with regard to the judiciary or more widely. As noted 
above, corruption in the judicial system, in particular, is a widespread 
problem.111 In theory, because they commit to “not practicing Chinese 
law,” foreign law firms are somewhat shielded from the implications 
of such corruption. But through collaborative relationships, they may 
at least acquire knowledge of ongoing corruption. Similarly, they may 
risk becoming implicated in corrupt business practices of their clients. 
The examples discussed here raise not only the question how, and 
in whose service, such firms work when they operate transnationally  
in business locations with autocratic legal systems. In the system 
governing Chinese lawyers, at least, the obligations imposed on 
domestic lawyers are incompatible with principled and professional 
service to the client and adherence to the rule of law, on any credible 
understanding of this concept. In some measure, Chinese lawyers are 
instead required to serve the Party-State, and such obligations and the 
problems they bring can affect collaboration with foreign legal 
professionals operating in China, as well as Chinese legal professionals 
operating abroad, as long as these individuals retain their status as 
lawyers subject to the standards of the “sender” country. An even more 
urgent concern is the potential for direct clashes between rules and 
principles governing the legal profession “there” and “here.” For 
example,  “soft law” human rights obligations and professional legal 
ethics obligations affect UK lawyers who go to China to work there. 
First, UK lawyers working abroad operate under standards of 
professional legal ethics, such as, the England and Wales Solicitors’ 
Regulation Authority’s 2013 Overseas Rules.112 These require, inter 
alia, that solicitors practicing overseas “act with integrity.”113 (They 
also require that solicitors “not allow [their] independence or the 
independence of [their] overseas practice to be compromised.” 114 
Even if only considering the obligations imposed upon 
Representative Offices by the Representative Office Regulation in 
conjunction with rules of professional ethics and discipline governing 
Chinese lawyers, it is hard to see how Principles 2 and 3 can be honored 
by lawyers admitted to practice in England and Wales who go to work 
 
111.  See PILS, supra note 40.  
112. Solicitors’ Regulation Authority, SRA Overseas Rules 2013  (2017). See Solicitors 
Regulation Authority, Introduction to SRA Overseas Rules (Oct. 1, 2017). 
113. Id.  
114. Id.  
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in China. There they will be required,  inter alia, to take on 
responsibility for their colleagues’ censoring themselves so as not to 
“stoke discontent” with the Party-State. They will also work in an 
environment  where the Party-State routinely interferes with the 
handling of certain kinds of legal case. Is working in and benefiting 
from organisations submitting to such requirements and such 
interference to act “with integrity”? Taking into account the wider 
problems of the Chinese legal system as it operates “on the ground,” 
including the “problem areas” briefly considered just above, there are 
even more reasons to be concerned about whether UK lawyers can “act 
with integrity” and fend off situations in which their independence is 
compromised. 115  
From its published sources, it is not at this point clear what the 
Law Society of England and Wales does to ensure that its Overseas 
Rules are adhered to. Given its effective status as regulator, some 
monitoring may reasonably be expected. It would in any event be 
desirable for the Law Society and similar bodies to provide public 
accounts of how they discharge their transnational responsibilities.  
Second, ommercial law firms are under soft law requirements at 
the international level. The UN Guiding Principles of Business and 
Human Rights (“UNGP”), endorsed unanimously by the Human rights 
Council in 20111, stipulate that business enterprises should respect 
human rights. 116  Prima facie, the designation “business enterprise” 
applies to large transnational law firms, whose operation can have a 
direct impact on the well-functioning or otherwise of domestic legal 
systems and hence on concerns such as access to justice, the right to a 
 
115 . Additional concerns may arise with regard to the new solicitors’ qualifying 
examinations (“SQE”) under the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority (“SRA”), a branch of the Law 
Society of England and Wales. According to its recent consultation paper, it seems possible that 
qualifying work experience could be gathered in China if it qualifies as a “a regulated, overseas 
jurisdiction,” providing “the opportunity for them to develop the practical legal skills that the 
SRA would [assess through the SQE].” SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY, A NEW ROUTE 
TO QUALIFICATION: THE SOLICITORS QUALIFYING EXAMINATION (2017). 
116. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS ‘PROTECT, RESPECT 
AND REMEDY’ FRAMEWORK (2011); John Gerard Ruggie, The social construction of the UN 
Business and Human Rights Principles, (Harvard Kennedy School Mossavar-Rahmani Center 
for Business and Government Corporate Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 67, 2017); 
Human Rights Due Diligence, BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://business-
humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-
companies/type-of-step-taken/human-rights-due-diligence (last visited July 3, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/8DYZ-5WN6]. 
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fair trial, and (as seen in the above context) on lawyers’ rights of 
freedom of speech.117 
As the International Bar Association (“IBA”) recognizes, 
professional bodies representing the legal profession should instruct 
their members on how the UNGP affect not only their clients, but 
potentially them as well.118 Certainly, the IBA is correct in stating that 
the UNGP cannot be taken to undermine any of the legal profession’s 
most central roles in supporting the rule of law and human rights, 119 
and this must include principles such as access to counsel for human 
rights violators. However, precisely because the role of lawyers in 
upholding human rights is so central, we surely need to hold them to at 
least the same requirements as other businesses when it comes to 
refrain from undermining rule of law and human rights principles, or 
to acting to uphold these principles as best they can. 
 
UNGP Principle no. 11 states that: 
Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that 
they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and 
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved.120 
Principle no 13 states: 
Business enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet 
their own human rights obligations, including by actions that 
might weaken the integrity of judicial processes.121 
According to the Commentary provided by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, this means in particular that: 
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business 
enterprises: (a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts through their own activities, and address such 
impacts when they occur; (b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse 
human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, 
 
117. The UNGP do not provide a definition of “business enterprise.”  See infra note 117 
on the IBA’s interpretation. 
118. See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 28 (2016), https://www.ibanet.org/LPRU/Business-
and-Human-Rights-for-the-Legal-Profession.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y5CK-7XWN] 
[hereinafter IBA]. 
119. See id. 
120.  U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 116. 
121. Id. 
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products or services by their business relationships, even if 
they have not contributed to those impacts. (Emphasis added)122 
Principle no 23 states: 
In all contexts, business enterprises should: (a) Comply with all 
applicable laws and respect internationally recognized human 
rights, wherever they operate; (b) Seek ways to honor the 
principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced 
with conflicting requirements; (c) Treat the risk of causing or 
contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance 
issue wherever they operate.123 
Taken together, these principles clearly enunciate the idea that 
business enterprises have human rights responsibilities. These 
responsibilities not only commit them to carrying out what is termed 
“human rights due diligence” to ensure that their responsibilities are 
not violated. 124 They also mean that operating in a legal system that 
contravenes human rights principles, the business enterprise is not 
neutral; it must “seek ways to honor” human rights principles. The 
failure to honor these responsibilities may result in specific legal 
liabilities, as the introduction of tort law rules connecting to the UNGP 
in France well illustrates.125 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If transnational law firms may have been unaware that they could 
not simply do business in China as if there were just a few, minor, 
technical variations on legal practice that needed to be taken into 
account, recent developments and discussions ought to have put them 
on notice. As this article has sought to show, China’s legal system is 
fundamentally incompatible with rule of law principles adhered to by 
the legal profession in the UK and in other jurisdictions organized on 
liberal principles. In the former, lawyers, law firms and the lawyers’ 
associations are expected to work in the service of a repressive Party-
State. In the latter, lawyers’ primary obligations are to law; and they 
are obligated to act in the best interest of their clients. Their 
independence is crucial; it is one of the principles that help protect 
 
122. Id. at 14. 
123. Id. at 25. 
124. Id. at 5; see Ruggie, supra note 116.  
125. See id. 
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those who might otherwise become defenseless against predatory 
practices of the state, or of the market. 
As the illiberal – or indeed, antiliberal – Chinese legal system 
systematically undermines lawyers’ independence and submits them to  
a thoroughly compromising system of regulation and oversight, it is 
important that liberal systems whose legal professions increasingly 
operate transnationally not neglect the ordering of the terms of their 
lawyers’ operations abroad. Of course, it is in a sense up to a host 
country, such as China, to set rules governing the foreign legal 
profession. But this does not absolve the countries from whose 
jurisdictions foreign lawyers come to China of the responsibility to 
insist that the host country honor its international commitments, and to 
create guidance for overseas legal practice compliant with basic rule of 
law principles. The 2013 Overseas Rules well illustrate that in the 
United Kingdom, this transnational responsibility has been recognized 
in principle. The question is, how is adherence to these standards 
ensured? Are problems with adherence addressed case by case? Do 
regulatory authorities in liberal jurisdictions engage with the more 
principled incompatibility issues such as those set out just above, and 
do they provide guidance on these to their lawyers? What regulatory 
mechanisms are in place to audit or investigate compliance with these 
standards on the part of transnational law firms operating abroad? 
Based on the analysis presented in this article, it is clear that law 
firms operating in China ought to conduct robust ‘human rights due 
diligence’ to ensure compliance with the UN Guiding Principles, and 
that regulatory bodies in other countries, such as the England and 
Wales Solicitors’ Regulation Authority, provide guidance on the 
compatibility of their 2013 Overseas Rules with China’s restrictive 
regulation and practices of extra-legal control of the legal profession. 
Beyond these immediate responsibilities, it would also be desirable that 
democratic parliaments scrutinise the effectiveness of the regulation of  
domestic  lawyers overseas practice, and their governments’ efforts, 
through government level interaction, to ensure that these lawyers are 
able to adhere to the professional standards they are bound to uphold, 
also when working in China.126 
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